比較法研究所公開講演会 by Szabo Zsolt
1早稲田大学比較法研究所
オンライン・フォーラム・シリーズ
比較法研究所公開講演会
Institute of Comparative Law Public Lecture Series
“Main challenges in the political systems of the Western Balkans”
サボ・ゾルト カロリ・ガスパー大学准教授（ハンガリー）
Assoc Prof. Szabo Zsolt Karoli Gaspar University (Hungary)
2018 年 7月 27 日開催
No.2019-1
2019 年 6 月
〒169-8050
東京都新宿区西早稲田 1-6-1
早稲田大学比較法研究所
2Main challenges in the political systems of the Western Balkans
Zsolt SZABÓ PhD LL.M.1
Abstract:
The West Balkans are a heterogeneous region, both in terms of culture and public law, in which -
with the closure of the armed ethnic conflicts of the 1990s – the basic conditions for an
autonomous state have now been established. This was achieved, in many cases, with the help of
other, already established states. The primary driver of state life today is European integration
constantly floating in the distant future. At the same time, many challenges hinder the
consolidation of the political system and this study aims to demonstrate these struggles of the
West Balkans by focusing on three main issues.
On the one hand, constitutionalism is often delayed, driven by exemplary and external factors:
constitutional power was often an external factor. On the other hand, democratic representation
is overwritten by ethnocratic rules, especially in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Northern Macedonia and
Kosovo. Thirdly, the establishment of an effective, modern justice and administration system
based on the rule of law and the division of powers is delayed and largely formal. Trust in
political institutions is low, which is also reflected on low electoral participation rates.
Introduction
The “Western Balkans” means the six countries that have been left out of European integration.
These areas (Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, North Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia)
have never formed a single cluster politically or historically and are only considered as
“European” because the EU’s equal-treating nature. This multilingual and multi-religious area is
highly heterogeneous, but there are still many common aspects and challenges in the history and
current situation of its countries.
The historical roots of the area are common, intertwined in the past. It is their shared destiny that
after the fall of independent Christian states (Serbia, Bulgaria), with large-scale but uncertain
borders, the entire Balkans came under Ottoman rule during the 14-15th century.
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3In the period after the fall of the Turkish Empire, the Balkans became the “powder-barrel” of
Europe. This was the result of the aspiration of independence of the Slavic peoples living here
and the conflict zone of great power interests. Since there were no clear historical borders that
could have been reversed after the suppression of Turkish rule2 and after a period of independent
statehood in the 19th century (which was the result of power interests) the major driving force
became the new South-Slav Alliance (Serbian-Croatian-Slovenian Kingdom, followed by
Yugoslavia – for a short time after WW II it seemed that Albania may also join).
Some of the six states can look back on longer independent history (Serbia, Montenegro), while
others only gained national recognition and autonomy later in the framework of the South-Slav
Alliance. Northern Macedonia, Kosovo, but also the Bosnian people, who, although not in their
own independent state, have wide autonomy. Linguistically, South Slavic dominance is
significant in the region (Serbian presence is prominent: excluding Albania, a large portion of
Serb population can be found in every country). In addition, the Albanian population is also
significant outside of Albania, especially in neighboring countries. The religious structure is also
diverse: although (eastern) Christianity is determining, Islam is the second denomination, the
main religion among Bosnians and Albanians.
The conflict of the end of the 20th century was already present in a dormant form. This was coded
in the ethnically-religiously mixed composition and the uncertain borders of the mother- and
neighboring countries. This resulted in a constant risk of separatism and the associated armed
conflict.
In terms of state life, there are three focal points of challenges in the Western Balkans: delayed
constitution due to external factors and ethnocratic rules that override democratic values, and the
delay of establishing a modern justice and administration system based on the rule of law and the
division of powers. In the following sections I intend to present the major public law challenges
in the Western Balkans, organized around the three issues discussed previously.
1. Constitution and state organization
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4The constitutional power was often present as an external factor in the Western Balkans. In the
regional state- and constitution building, external powers often exerted a greater influence than
internal processes. We first meet with a forced constitution in Serbia in the 19th century (by the
Ottoman Empire). The great powers decided on the region during the 1878 Berlin Congress,
where no representatives of the Balkan states (released from the jurisdiction of the Turkish
Empire) were invited – however, it is true that their sovereign states have not yet existed. The
next major (re)arrangement was also the result of the decisions made by the great powers, which
also ended the WW I peace system. Also, Bosnia-Herzegovina’s 1995 and Serbia and
Montenegro’s State Union constitution was indeed a de facto forced constitution. The oversight
of the great powers, especially the US, played a key role in internal crises: the 1998 Albanian
Constitution and 2001 Kosovo/Ohrid settlement were also created with American mediation.
International organizations also played an important role in building democracy and market
economy. For instance the UN Development Program under the auspices of the United Nations,
the United States’ own program, the USAID, the OSCE, the World Bank and the EU. Despite the
significant external donor, advisory and state-building project, the spectacular success – the
stable functioning of the democratic institutional system and the rule of law – awaits for the time
being.
During the last two decades of democratization, a separate constitutional process has begun on a
parliamentary path. Serbia adopted a new constitution in 2006, Montenegro adopted the basic law
in 2008, the oldest 1991 basic law of Macedonia was amended in 2001under the Ohrid
Convention, and was again amended in 2018, when the name-dispute was closed. Only Bosnia-
Herzegovina’s constitutional reforms were left behind, although a 2006 attempt was close to
finally achieve change. Due to joining the EU, further amendments will be needed. The question
is to what extents can the constitution maker remain independent and how can it (the constitution
maker) orient the political actors divided by ethnical differences.
A decade ago, in 2008 in the region, Reinhard called for the development of justice and
parliamentary structures, alongside the economic constitution as the most important constitutional
task.3 The time since then has brought some improvement in the functioning of parliaments (new
3 PRIEBE, Reinhard: Beitrittsperspektive und Verfassungsreformen in den Ländern des Westlichen Balkans,
Europarecht. - 43.évf. 3.sz. (2008.) 310-319.
5house rules, increasing publicity), but the effectiveness of legislation, the acceptance of
constitutional values in political culture – especially in ethnically divided societies – is not
satisfactory.
In the case of a Constitution change, the amendment(s) will appear in the Appendix. With a batch
of modifications, many of these amendments can expand the line of appendices. Thus, there are
32 such constitutional amendments in Macedonia, 24 in Kosovo and 16 in Montenegro
(numbered as Roman numerals) “attached” to the Constitution. However, there has not been any
amendment in the Serbian Constitution since its 2006 adoption.4
One of the common features of the region is the role of referendums in the struggle for
independence. This is how the people of Bosnia-Herzegovina (1992), Northern Macedonia
(1991) and Montenegro (2006) decided on independence. At the same time, the involvement of
the people on the constitution was much more modest, only in Serbia and Albania was the basic
law put on a referendum. In Serbia, in 1990 and 2006 the Milosevic and current Constitution was
confirmed by a referendum. In Albania twice, in 1994 and 1998 a referendum was held on the
constitution, but only the latter was successful.
In spite of the different historical and ethnic backgrounds, the public institutions of the six West
Balkan states have many parallels. The form of government is parliamentary: the executive
(government) is responsible to the parliament and needs it constant political support and the head
of government is elected by the parliament. The state structure in Serbia (autonomy of
Vojvodina) and Bosnia-Herzegovina (entities) are multi-level, and s united (Unitarian) in the
other states. The Constitutional Court works everywhere.
The direct election of the head of state - (Serbia, Montenegro, Northern Macedonia and Bosnia-
Herzegovina), which pushes the states of Serbian language primarily towards a semi-presidential
government - does not contradict this. The president is not an independent power (the definite
outlines of presidentialization are only observable in Serbia), and has more influence on politics
than public law. Despite the different methods of election, there is no significant difference in the
public law situation of the head of state, the limited (one time only, exercised in a short-term)
right to veto is a characteristic of the whole region. Only in Bosnia-Herzegovina alone the right to
4KÜPPER, Herbert – SZABÓ, Zsolt: A jogalkotás alkotmányos keretei Közép- és Kelet-Európában [Constitutional
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6veto is not known (the right to return laws to the parliament). The weakness of the (political) veto
by the head of state is illustrated by the fact that the laws requiring qualified majority in Albania
and Macedonia cannot be returned at all. In Kosovo and Montenegro, the parliament can accept
the returned law with the original minority. In Albania, Macedonia and Serbia, the Parliament can
adopt the returned law with an absolute majority instead of a simple majority.
There was also a kind of spontaneous integration in the electoral system: by the end of the 2000s,
the election system in the Western Balkans was clearly proportional. In Macedonia (6 districts)
and Albania (12 districts) you can vote on regional lists, and in other states on national lists.
Preferential elements are not included in the electoral system, i.e. the parties have a decisive
influence on the nominations.
In five of the six countries, the parliament consists of only one camber, except for the parliament
of Bosnia-Herzegovina and one of its entities, where it is two-chambered. Bosnia-Herzegovina –
as an exception in the region – consists of two levels of legislation: two entities (the Federation of
Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of Serbia) share the territory of the country. Besides
the governments of these entities, there is a state-level, two chamber parliament in the country.
The Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina itself is a federal state: it consists of ten cantons,
which Have their own parliaments and exercise their own legislative powers (these cantons are
not the subject of this study). The Parliament of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina is
also a two-chamber legislature; the Parliament of the Republic of Serbia is composed of only one
chamber. 5 It is true for both Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Federation the two chambers are
symmetrical: they have the same right in decision-making. All the parliaments of the region are
chosen for a 4-year period.
In Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina, Parliament’s capability to act is limited by the presence of
the international community, albeit to a decreasing extent. In Kosovo, since 2014, international
organizations gave only served as advisory powers, while in Bosnia-Herzegovina the remit of the
UN High Representative has remained, but has not practiced its right in the last decade. The level
5 The Council of the Peoples, introduced by the High Representative in 2002, exercises quasi-upper house power. It
does not participate in the legislative process, but controls ex ante the laws and other legislation adopted by the
parliament of the Republic of Serbia to determine whether the law, decree or other legislation adopted violates
national minority interests.
7of international supervision is indicated by the fact that three members of the nine-member
Constitutional Court of Bosnia-Herzegovina are appointed by the ECHR, from a pool of
internationally recognized foreign lawyers.
2. Ethnocracy
Ethnic heterogeneity and the resulting conflicts entangle the entire state life, especially in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Kosovo and Northern Macedonia. There are several models for the sharing of
political power between ethnic groups: in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the equal treatment of “state-
forming nations” and mutual veto right, the proportional representation of minority groups in
Kosovo and Northern Macedonia is evident. The latter two are also different: while in North
Macedonia, the Albanians received such rights on their own demand, the Serbs who did not
recognize the statehood of the country (Kosovo) did not ask for such rights in Kosovo, despite
their “unwillingness”, but nonetheless got the rights so the young country can meet the
expectations of the international community. Montenegro is interesting from this point of view,
being a multi-ethnic, heterogeneous state. But politics does not settle the poles only on the basis
of ethnic boundaries, but on the basis of their approach to certain fundamental issues; such as
relations with Serbia or the issue of a common Montenegrin identity. For this reason, the party
system is not as ethicized as in other multinational states, like in Bosnia-Herzegovina,
Montenegro or Kosovo.6
In Montenegro and Serbia minority parties can obtain a parliamentary mandate with a preferential
quota, however, in Northern Macedonia there is no threshold for parties to obtain mandates.
Only Albania does not support minority representation in any way: the establishment of and
ethnic party is forbidden and minorities are not guaranteed parliamentary seats.
The most obvious means of exercising and sharing ethnic-based power is to place state
institutions on an ethnic basis. This seems to be the most consistent with the state of Bosnia-
Herzegovina: it always provides the same ethnic representation (and only to them) in certain
positions, regardless of the outcome of the election. These stone-engraved ethnic proportions
cannot be changed in a democratic way, i.e. democracy is overridden by ethnocracy. There are
6TOMIC, Caroline Hornstein: Interethnische Beziehungen in Südosteuropa – Ein Bericht zur Lage in Bosnien-
Herzegowina, Kosovo, Kroatien, Mazedonien, Montenegro und Serbien. Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2008
8similar rules in Kosovo: the Serbian minority, irrespective of the election result, is entitled to 10
seats in the parliament, and the “quota” of other minorities is also defined. Macedonia tried to
support ethnic representation through parliamentary voting rules and abolition of the electoral
threshold for advancing ethnic parties. These solutions are mostly at the expense of democratic
actions, not resolving but preserving the ethnic divisions and paralyzing the state.
In the case of Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina, state symbols (coat of arms, flag) also express
multinational existence (star motif), these symbols have been created with the support of the
international community. They are not bound to any ethnic group but are neutral, artificial
symbols that suggest diversity. The two countries also similar in their constitutional system, that
it is not based on democratic representation but on ethnocratic veto rights.
The Venice Commission, examining the North Macedonian solution, stated that the dual majority
decision-making required by the Constitution would only work if it was not possible to change
the membership of the ethnic community at any time, therefore, it has to be clear which member
belong to which ethnic group. Otherwise, the ethnic majority rule could be circumvented by the
fact that a faction or political group persuades its members to declare themselves belonging to
another ethnic group. The Venice Commission therefore argues for registration to an ethnic group,
which is an indispensable element of the dual majority rule. In contrast to Kosovo, there is no
legal quota for minorities in Northern Macedonia, i.e. minority representatives are not introduced
into the parliament by legal but by political logic. For this reason, it is not impossible that
members claim to be ethnically different from their real ethnical origin, manipulating the results
of the vote.
In Kosovo and Northern Macedonia, as we have seen, the law does not provide permanent veto
right to ethnic group, but involves them in certain decisions. However, this was precisely the
reason why it was necessary to find a solution for the majority-minority relationship, rather than
the reconciliation of nationally-constituting states.
The need for constitutional reform in Bosnia-Herzegovina is primarily due to the fact that certain
provisions of the Fundamental Law have been contradicted by the European Court of Human
Rights, the ECHR, since certain positions of the three “state-forming nations” have to be filled
equally. Thus excluding other national representatives of an ethnic minority form representation
9and exercising power (for more information on the decision, see the chapter on the
interrelationship of multinational existence). However, - without a formal amendment to the
Constitution - a constitutional development process was launched in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which
is driven by the UN High Representative. This is how, in the recent years, a unified justice and
prosecution system was built up, and the constitutionality of the process has been confirmed by
the State Constitutional Court.
3. Power sharing and rule of law
The stabilization of the political system is still awaiting the West Balkans. Trust in political
institutions is low. There is hardly any parliament in the area where the opposition would not
have announced a boycott in parliamentary work. After the election – which often takes place
with a very low rate of participation – the formation of parliament and government is delayed due
to political debates, sometimes leading to a temporary total paralysis of institutions. The
opposition has rightly recognized that empty benches, the lack of political discourse in the
countries ahead of European integration can be an effective means of pressure for the majority in
Parliament. If it is not a domestic requirement, the EU institutions are sensitive to this –
boycotting parliamentary work is always a top priority in the Union’s monitoring reports. These
actions usually ended up with concession to the opposition, although they did not always brought
real results. The European Union took up on the role of mediator on several occasions between
the government and opposition. Regular progress reports from the EU show a number of
shortcomings on the same areas in many countries in the region: free elections, the legal status of
parties, the functioning of parliaments.
Strengthening the rule of law and democracy is primarily an external constraint: since 2011, the
European Union has adopted a new approach to the Western Balkans. Chapter 23 (courts and
fundamental rights) and 24 (truth, freedom, security) are pre-classified against others, and the
implementation of fundamental reforms in these areas are conditions for opening other chapters.
A key item of the legislative agenda is European integration in every state. In the course of
legislation, accelerated procedures are increasingly used during legal harmonization. The level of
competence required to the over the aquis in the multi-level Bosnia-Herzegovina is divided
between the different levels, but these levels (state, entities, and cantons) are hardly working in
practice, which significantly hinders the joining process.
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However, the greatest challenge is the creation of judicial independence, as politics still has a
decisive influence on the appointment of judges, or directly on the basis of parliamentary election
by the judiciary or on the political influence of the judiciary on the appointment of judges.
Parliamentary investigation of executive powers is still generally weak, weightless (parliamentary
questions, committees of inquiry), and ministers are often simply absent from parliamentary
investigations. Corruption investigation paralyzed several institutions (only two of the nine-
member Albanian Constitutional Court passed the investigation). Both public administration and
the judiciary are repeatedly lacking in professionals, and low wages only contribute to the high
level of corruption in these areas, despite the ongoing fight.
Yugoslavia, based partly on the traditions of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, had relatively
significant administrative history: there was administrative jurisdiction and, since 1930, it was a
general administrative procedure coded at federal level. The latter was taken over by all successor
states and, in the 2000s, it was modified according to its own need, and the replaced by its own
procedural codes. The Yugoslav Constitutional Court also looks back on a long history: in 1963,
a benchmarking body was set up in all republics as well as at federal level. True, its powers did
not extend to the termination of laws, but only to the indication of unconstitutionality. Despite
these common roots, we cannot speak of a common legal or administrative culture in the Western
Balkans today.
The legacy of the 19th century and socialist administration is extensive, uncompetitive
bureaucracy, with insufficient resources and democratic legitimacy. The incompletion of public
affairs and corruption further worsen the already low efficiency. A stable, predictable, transparent
public administration is the most missed element of the EU progress reports, although there is no
“administrative” accession chapter, there are no specific indicators and standards for the
functioning of individual bodies, instead “political” criteria appear. In the light of the credible
conditionality and the lack operational instruments, EU criticism may appear to be partly
unilateral. At the same time, however, public administration reform processes are not consistent,
are not sufficiently strategic-driven, they are rather person-dependent and isolated. A research
has shown that there is no common administrative reform model 7 in the region, and the
7 BOUCKAERT, Geert, et al. (eds.): Public Management Reforms in Centraland Eastern Europe. Bratislava:
NISPAcee, 2008.
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development of individual sectors sometimes happen on a random, ad hoc basis. Public
administration reform is progressing slowly, important laws have been created, but the reform of
the administrative culture still waits.
In any case, there are substantial financial resources available for the development of public
administration. For example, in 2011-12 24 million Euros was spent on cross-border
administrative developments. Much of this resource was funneled in the Regional School of
Public Administration (ReSPA). Its professional activities, western relations and training began
in 2011, in Danilovgrad, Montenegro covering all six states. It is worth mentioning the
Fellowship for Government Officials from the Western Balkans program, which offers a short (3
month) traineeship in the member states of the EU. Since 2008, 200 officials from the Western
Balkans were involved in the program. The SIGMA Program (Support for Improvement in
Governance and Management), established by the European Commission in 1992 for
administrative capacity development, also plays an important role. Since then, SIGMA has set up
a monitoring system to measure administrative performance with regular data and reports without
imposing a specific administrative model on the countries.
Despite all these positive initiatives, the EU promotes the Weber-model of administration with
stable, professional, well-paid staff, the creation of which is not going smoothly in the Western
Balkans. However, there are encouraging signs: the codification of the modern administrative
procedure and the strengthening of the e-administration system have taken place in the recent
years. The administrative staff is gradually becoming more professional, with many positive
initiatives in training.
Summary
With the end of the armed conflicts of the 1990s and their independence in each of the Western
Balkan states – often with external help – the conditions of an independent state operation have
been created. The main driver of public administration reforms is European integration. The
process is evaluated by external actors, and implementations and development is made possible
by external sources. In this way, the process becomes controlled from the outside, the place of
internal motivation is taken over by the willingness to meet external factor and to earn financial
and political incentives.
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All in all, it can be said that the perspective offered by the EU is attractive to the countries of the
Western Balkans, but the question is whether this will be enough to go beyond their internal
debates and crises, as was the case for the Visegrád countries, for instance. This involves the
distant possibility of joining the EU, which has less impact on the strategy of actors than it would
be for an event in the near future. Gradual build-up of democracy and the rule of law is not an
internal, electoral desire, but an external pressure, rather formal than actual, and does not bring
about systemic changes.
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